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The following analysis details the history of contraction in pro-
fessional baseball and other sports, while also examining some of
the business justifications for contraction. After reviewing the num-
bers and figures, the reader is invited to decide whether it makes
financial sense for Major League Baseball ("MLB") to contract. Ac-
cordingly, most of the numbers and figures used in this article are
based on those presented by MLB to Congress in December of
2001.1
II. HISTORY OF BASEBALL CONTRACTION
Beginning in 1876 and until 1899, several National League
teams declared bankruptcy and folded.2 Beyond the financial moti-
vations, the National League also eliminated clubs for other rea-
sons, such as disciplinary problems.3
* Lecturer, Legal Studies Department, University of Pennsylvania-Wharton
School. I would like to thank my fellow symposium participants for their insights.
1. See Stephen Hawkins, Fehr: Numbers Don't Tell Whole Story, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 7, 2001 (noting in 2001 owners sustained $232 million operating loss plus
additional $519 million in interest payments and depreciation), available at http://
www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/stories/2001-12-06-fehr-reax.htm. Players
Union Chief Donald Fehr did not dispute the figures compiled by Baseball Com-
missioner Bud Selig for the House Judiciary Committee. See id. Rather, Fehr be-
lieved the lack of detail accompanying the figures made it impossible to truly
understand exactly what the figures meant. See id.
2. See ROGER I. ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH: BASEBALL FREE AGENCY AND SALARY
ARBITRATION 17 (2000) (noting in 1900 National League eliminated four of its
twelve teams due to unprofitability); Jason Beck, A Brief History of Contraction, at
http://sportsline.com/u/ce/feature/0,1518,4486996-52,00.html (last visited Oct.
22, 2002) [hereinafter Beck]. The eliminated teams included Baltimore, Louis-
ville, Washington, and Cleveland, which joined the National League eight years
earlier out of the defunct American Association. See id.
3. SeeJAMES QuiPK & RODNEY FORT, PAY DIRT 380 (2d ed. 1997). In 1877, the
National League eliminated its Louisville franchise after evidence surfaced that the
team threw games during the 1876 season. See id. In 1876, the league cancelled
the Philadelphia franchise for disciplinary reasons when the team refused to com-
plete its schedule by playing its remaining games in western cities. See id. at 381.
Similarly, the New York franchise was also eliminated in 1876 after the team re-
fused to travel to western cities to complete its competitive schedule. See id.
(29)
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In 1877, the original Louisville Grays team disbanded after
only their second season when it was discovered that four players
fixed games. 4 Shortly thereafter, the league terminated the St.
Louis Brown Stockings after the team openly supported the four
expelled Grays players. 5 In 1880, the National League dropped the
Cincinnati Red Stockings after the franchise refused to ban both
the sale of beer and Sunday games. 6 Additionally, the league can-
celled both the original New York Mutuals and Philadelphia Athlet-
ics franchises after their first seasons when both teams refused to
travel to western cities to complete their playing schedules. 7
There were also more sinister reasons why baseball clubs
folded. In order to acquire a team's prized players, competitor
franchises purchased baseball teams and later folded them. In one
instance during the 1885 season, the Detroit Wolverines franchise
bought the Buffalo franchise for $7000 to obtain the team's four
star players and then collapsed the team.8
In 1887, the National League itself eliminated three teams, in-
cluding the Kansas City Cowboys who played only one year in 1886.9
The National League bought the Kansas City franchise and players
for $6000 and subsequently cancelled the team's license, disbursing
4. See MARSHALL D. WRIGHT, NINETEENTH CENTURY BASEBALL: YEAR-BY-YEAR
STATISTICS FOR THE MAJOR LEAGUE TEAMs, 1871 THROUGH 1900, at 45 (1996). The
Louisville Grays stumbled despite maintaining first place in the National League
through most of August 1877. See id. The Grays's four star players accused of
fixing games played particularly poorly during their decline from first place. See id.
All four players ultimately confessed that gamblers paid them to deliberately lose
games. See id. The National League immediately banned the four players from
baseball. See id.
5. SeeQuIRK & FORT, supra note 3, at 382. The 1876 and 1877 seasons marked
an era of reconstruction for the National League, as many teams were either
forced to leave under the auspices of disciplinary measures or were disbanded for
financial reasons. See id. For example, National League teams in Kansas City, Lou-
isville, St. Louis, Philadelphia, and New York were all cancelled by the end of the
1877 season. See id.
6. See Beck, supra note 2 (noting National League leaders ordered member
clubs to ban gambling, liquor sales, and Sunday games, and to draw up tightly
written contracts).
7. See WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 40 (noting both New York and Philadelphia
refused to travel on their last western road trip for financial reasons). In a unani-
mous vote, the owners of the National League voted to expel the two clubs even
though they represented the two largest cities in the league. See id.
8. See id. at 152 (explaining Buffalo ownerJosiahJewett sold team and its four
star players due to financial crisis). Buffalo's lineup featured the "Big Four," con-
sisting of Dan Brouthers, Deacon White, Jack Rowe, and Hardy Richardson. See id.
9. See Beck, supra note 2 (noting Kansas City Cowboys disbanded after only
one season).
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the players to other teams. 10 Similarly, in 1887, the National
League purchased the St. Louis Barons, which played two years in
1885 and 1886, for $12,000.11 Thereafter, the team relocated to
Indianapolis. 12
In 1891, the National League expanded from eight to twelve
teams when it merged with the American Association, adding
franchises in Baltimore, Louisville, St. Louis, and Washington. 13
Eight years later, the league eliminated the Washington Senators,
Baltimore Orioles, Cleveland Spiders, and Louisville Colonels, ar-
guably the four weakest teams. 14 In one of those transactions,
Washington Senators owner J. Earl Wagner received $39,000 from
the National League in return for his franchise and players.1 5
In 1900, the owners of the Baltimore Orioles sold their
franchise and the right to sell the players on its roster to the Na-
tional League for $30,000.16 A majority of the team's most talented
10. See WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 152. Prior to the 1887 season, the Pittsburgh
franchise moved from the American Association to the National League. See id.
The addition of the Pittsburgh club offset the loss of the Kansas City team. See id.
11. See id. (noting St. Louis franchise moved to Indianapolis before start of
1887 season). The city's other team, the St. Louis Browns, was a charter member
of the American Association and a winner of four pennants in a row. See id. at 159.
The Browns were called the "class of the American Association." See id. at 152.
12. See id. After moving the St. Louis Barons franchise to Indianapolis to be-
come the Hoosiers, the team had an unsuccessful year, finishing with a thirty-seven
and eighty-nine win-loss record or a .294 winning percentage. See id. at 157. The
Hoosiers' dismal record garnered the team a last place finish out of the eight
teams in the National League. See id.
13. See Beck, supra note 2 (explaining prior to merger one man or group
owned teams in National League and American Association). The Baltimore Ori-
oles thrived due to players Ned Hanlon and John McGraw. See id. Conversely, the
St. Louis Browns, Louisville Cyclones, and Washington Senators all struggled. See
id.
14. See WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 311. By the end of the 1899 season, baseball
team owners realized that a twelve-team league could not survive without enough
strong franchises to fill the spots. See id. Therefore, the owners decided a downsiz-
ing of the National League was the perfect solution to the problem. See id. By
cutting off some of the dead wood, the league would not have to account for the
expense of buttressing the weaker teams. See id. The Baltimore and Cleveland
franchises represented logical choices for dismissal because they sold the talent of
their respective teams elsewhere. See id. Louisville, whose ballpark burned down
the summer before, was under heavy financial burden. See id. The Washington
franchise was a perennial loser on the field in the standings and off the field in the
box office. See id.
15. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 3, at 383 (noting Washington franchise was
abandoned after 1899 season when National League downsized number of teams).
The Washington Senators owner would have received an additional $7500 from
the National League had he not already sold some of his star players to the Boston
Nationals. See id.
16. See id. at 378 (explaining Baltimore franchise was part of downsizing
movement of National League in 1899 and 1900). Although Baltimore received
3
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players, however, were no longer on the Baltimore roster due to the
prior purchase of part of the Brooklyn Superbas by Orioles owners
Ned Hanlon and Harry von der Horst.17 Hanlon and von der Horst
transferred most of the top Baltimore Orioles players to the Brook-
lyn team prior to the start of the 1899 season.' 8
Soon after the sale of the Baltimore Orioles, Louisville Colo-
nels owner Barney Dreyfuss, who also co-owned the Pittsburgh
franchise, received $10,000 from the National League for his
franchise and players. 19  Prior to the 1899 season, however,
Dreyfuss transferred most of the players on his Louisville roster to
his Pittsburgh franchise. 20
The final team eliminated was the Cleveland Spiders.21 The
Cleveland Spiders owner received $25,000 from the National
League for his franchise and players. 22 Prior to the 1899 season,
the Robison family, who also owned the St. Louis Perfectos
franchise, relocated most of the quality Spiders players to the St.
Louis franchise. 23 The Spiders finished the season with 20 wins and
134 losses, marking the worst record in baseball history.24
By 1900, the National League shrank from twelve to eight
teams. 25 The remaining teams included franchises in Boston,
the right to sell players on its roster, most of the good players had already been
transferred to the Brooklyn franchise during the 1899 season. See id.
17. See Beck, supra note 2 (noting Baltimore franchise lost managerJohn Mc-
Graw, along with top players HughieJennings, Wee Willie Keeler, andJoe Kelley to
Brooklyn Superbas when Baltimore owners Ned Hanlon and Harry von der Horst
bought into Brooklyn franchise). The Brooklyn franchise proceeded to win the
1899 pennant. See id.
18. See id. (crediting new additions with helping Brooklyn win National
League Pennant in 1899).
19. See QUiRK & FORT, supra note 3, at 380 (describing elimination of Louis-
ville franchise after National League decided to cut to eight teams).
20. See id. at 380 (noting in 1898 most of Louisville.players transferred to Pitts-
burgh franchise for start of 1899 season).
21. See id. at 379 (explaining cancellation of Cleveland franchise after 1899
season when National League downsized from twelve to eight teams).
22. See id. (noting Cleveland Spiders was expansion team created in 1889
under ownership of Matthew Stanley Robison and Frank De Haas Robison).
23. See id. at 382 (relating in 1899, Matthew S. and Frank De Haas Robison
bought St. Louis franchise for $40,000 and transferred most of good players from
Cleveland to St. Louis for remainder of season).
24. See The Early Years, at http://cleveland.indians.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/
cle/history/cle.history-overview.jsp (last visited Oct. 22, 2002) (noting Cleveland
team dropped from National League after worst season in history). By the turn of
the century, Cleveland was once again an established MLB city whose team had the
honor of playing the first American League game in the sport's history. See id.
25. See WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 311 (explaining in March 1900, National
League's Circuit Committee voted four teams out of league as effort to save ex-
penses and aid successful teams). The Committee paid off the Washington, Balti-
[Vol. 10: p. 29
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Brooklyn, Chicago, Cincinnati, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
and St. Louis.26
Despite losing National League teams, professional baseball
quickly returned to Washington, Baltimore, and Cleveland. In
1901, the Washington Senators, Baltimore Orioles, and Cleveland
Blues became original franchises with different ownership in the
newly created American League. 27
III. HISTORY OF CONTRACTION IN OTHER SPORTS
Besides baseball, other professional sports have experienced
contraction problems as well. Between 1920 and 1952, the National
Football League ("NFL") cancelled thirty-eight franchises because
of financial difficulties. 28 No NFL franchise, however, has folded
since the first incarnation of the Dallas Texans in 1952.29
In addition, when the Basketball Association of America
merged with the National Basketball League in 1949 and 1950 to
form the National Basketball Association ("NBA"), ten teams
more, and Cleveland teams in cash, while the Louisville team was paid less because
it was merging with Pittsburgh. See id. The eight remaining National League
teams enjoyed a fruitful season, with Brooklyn taking the pennant for the second
year in a row. See id.
26. See id. (noting in 1900, National League accomplished its economic and
competitive goals). The eight remaining franchises finished the year in a fiscally
sound state, and the only debt the league incurred was the buyout fees for the four
extinct franchises. See id. In addition, each of the surviving teams enjoyed a com-
petitive season, with even last place New York only twenty-three games out of first
place. See id.
27. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 3, at 399-409. The American League began
in 1900, featuring teams in Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis,
Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis. See WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 318. Ban
Johnson christened the American League in 1900 by shifting a franchise into the
newly vacated city of Cleveland and by boldly placing a team into the National
League stronghold city of Chicago. See id. Although considered a minor league
for its first year, Johnson claimed in 1901 that the American League would hence-
forth be a major league on equal footing with the National League. See id. at 319.
28. See NFL Franchise Year-by-Year Genealogy, at http://www.football.com/his-
tory/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). In 1952, the New York Yankees foot-
ball team folded and the NFL sold the assets of the team to a Dallas group who
then formed the Dallas Texans. See id. That same year, the Dallas Texans
franchise folded and was taken over by the NFL. See id. In 1953, the NFL formally
reinstated the defunct Dallas Texans franchise as the Baltimore Colts. See id.
29. See id. (explaining after reinstatement of Dallas Texans as Baltimore Colts
no other franchises folded in NFL).
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folded.30 The folded NBA franchises included the Anderson Pack-
ers, Chicago Stags, Sheboygan Redskins, and Waterloo Hawks.3'
In 1951, the owners of the Indianapolis Olympians, all former
college basketball players at the University of Kentucky, were ac-
cused of being involved in a point-shaving scandal during their col-
lege careers. 32 Three years later, the Olympians went bankrupt and
the franchise was eliminated before the beginning of the 1954
season.
33
The NBA has not contracted a team since the 1954 to 1955
season, when the first version of the Baltimore Bullets franchise was
eliminated.34 In 1958, the NBA placed the Minneapolis Lakers,
now in Los Angeles, on financial probation.3 5 The NBA informed
the team's owner that the team had to average $6600 in gate re-
ceipts per game for the 1959 season or the NBA would exercise its
option to buy the club for $150,000 and relocate it to another city.36
The owner of the club was hesitant to strike against the NBA, and
instead moved the Lakers to Los Angeles shortly thereafter for the
1960 season.37
In yet another sport, the National Hockey League ("NHL")
had several clubs that folded for financial reasons during the
league's formative years.38 Namely, the New York Americans, Mon-
treal Maroons, and Montreal Wanderers all folded.39 Moreover,
30. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 3, at 446-59 (illustrating Baltimore Bullets
team disbanded midway through 1954 to 1955 season and Chicago Stags franchise
cancelled before 1950 season).
31. See id. The Anderson Packers franchise was cancelled before the 1950
season. See id. at 446. After the Chicago Stags joined the NBA in 1949 from the
Basketball Association of America, the franchise was disbanded the very next sea-
son in 1950. See id. at 449. The Sheboygan Redskins were also cancelled before
the end of the 1950 season after they had been added to the NBA in a merger the
year before. See id. at 458. The Waterloo Hawks followed the same scenario, being
cancelled in 1950, one year after entering the NBA. See id. at 459.
32. See id. at 452 (indicating owners implicated in game throwing scandal
from college-playing days).
33. See id. (noting cancellation of Indianapolis Olympians franchise before
1954 season).
34. See GERALD W. SCULLY, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 18 (1995) (not-
ing NBA shrunk to its smallest size of eight teams during 1954 to 1955 season).
35. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 3, at 453 (explaining NBA's option to
purchase team if gate receipt requirements were not met).
36. See id. (noting low gate receipts for Minneapolis Lakers franchise).
37. See id. at 454 (illustrating team's movement and renaming Los Angeles
Lakers under ownership of Bob Short).
38. See id. at 463-69 (highlighting reasons for cancellation of various teams'
franchises during NHL's early years).
39. See id. (noting New York Americans franchise cancelled due to financial
difficulties; Montreal Maroons franchise cancelled before 1939 to 1940 season af-
[Vol. 10: p. 29
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the Philadelphia Quakers and St. Louis Eagles had their players dis-
bursed to other teams.40
Most recently, the NHL endured a saga involving the Califor-
nia Golden Seals and the Cleveland Barons.41 The California
Golden Seals, which became the Cleveland Barons, was a long-
troubled franchise that went bankrupt twice. 42 The owners, George
and Gordon Gund, lost three million dollars from 1973 to 1978. 43
In 1977 to 1978, the Gunds merged the club with another club they
owned, the Minnesota North Stars.44 They maintained ownership
of the Cleveland club, and the Minnesota franchise assumed both
teams' players. 45 The Cleveland club went out of business, but
more importantly, the North Stars, who were able to keep many of
their best players, acquired some of Cleveland's best athletes. 46
The North Stars greatly benefited from this merger and reached
the Stanley Cup finals a few seasons later.47
The most recent contraction, perhaps not as visible on the pro-
fessional sports scope in the United States, involved Major League
Soccer ("MLS"). MLS began play with ten teams in 1996, and then
added teams in Chicago and Miami for the 1998 season.48 OnJanu-
ary 8, 2002, however, MLS eliminated both the Miami Fusion and
Tampa Bay Mutiny from further participation in the league. 49
ter one-year suspension for financial problems; and Montreal Wanderers out of
business when rink burned down during 1917 to 1918 season).
40. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 3, at 470-72 (noting NHL purchase of
teams). The Philadelphia Quakers voluntarily suspended operations for one year
in 1931 due to financial problems, and the franchise was cancelled before the start
of the 1932 to 1933 season. See id. at 471. The NHL bought the St. Louis Eagles
and distributed the players among the existing teams. See id. at 472.
41. See id. at 465 (highlighting history of Cleveland Barons's financial
difficulties).
42. See id. (indicating team losses of three million dollars in 1977 to 1978
season and cessation of team existence after merging with Minnesota North Stars).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 468 (stating team merged with Minnesota North Stars while San-
ford Greenburg, former minority owner of Cleveland Barons, continued as minor-
ity owner in newly merged team).
45. See QuiRK & FORT, supra note 3, at 465 (noting Cleveland Barons went out
of existence after team merged with Minnesota North Stars).
46. See id. at 468 (noting no name change after Cleveland Barons merged
with Minnesota North Stars).
47. See Minnesota North Stars 1967-1993, at http://www.northstarshockey.com/
81run.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2002) (recounting North Stars's achievements in
1981).
48. See About Major League Soccer: General Overview, at http://mlsnet.com/
about/league/overview.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002) (recounting history of
MLS from its inception through past seven seasons).
49. See MLS Eliminates Fsion, Mutiny, at http://mlsnet.com/content/02/
mls0108miatb.html (Jan. 8, 2002) (announcing unanimous decision by MLS Board
2003]
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Ironically, the Miami Fusion was the best team in MLS for the
2001 regular season, finishing first in the league.50 Nonetheless,
the team ranked tenth in the league in average attendance and
failed to acquire funding for a soccer-exclusive facility even though
Miami was renowned for its soccer fanatics. 5 1 The Tampa Bay
franchise, which conversely finished last in the regular season, had
ranked eleventh of twelve teams in average attendance during the
2001 season. 52
MLS operated and funded the Tampa Bay franchise since its
inception. 53 The Miami franchise had an Investor-Operator, which
the MLS Board of Governors believed was imperative to make the
structure of MLS work. 54 One of Miami's owners was Kenneth
Horowitz, who reportedly lost fifty million dollars over four years
with the team.55 Upon contracting the Miami Fusion, the league
stated that the South Florida market was "not capable at [the] time
of supporting an MLS team."56 MLS made this statement in refer-
ence to the team's poor corporate support and sponsorship and
notoriously difficult fan base in South Florida.57 The Dallas Burn,
Colorado Rapids, and other franchises of MLS were also considered
for contraction, but ultimately survived. 58
of Governors to cease operation of Tampa Bay Mutiny and Miami Fusion teams
immediately).
50. See MLS Teleconference: Jan. 8, 2002, available at http://mlsnet.com/con-
tent/02/mls0108teleconference.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter
MLS Teleconference] (quoting statement made by MLS investor Kenneth Horowitz
who said Miami was winningest team during 2001 and was one game away from
entering MLS Cup).
51. See id. (quoting MLS Commissioner Don Garber that Miami Fusion had
third lowest fan attendance of twelve MLS teams).
52. See Gary Davidson, MLS Eliminates Tampa Bay Mutiny, Miami Fusion, Leav-
ing Anschutz, Hunt Running Seven of 10 Remaining Teams, at http://www.soccer-
times.com/mls/2002/jan08.htm (Jan. 8, 2001) (noting Tampa Bay Mutiny all-time
attendance was 11,072 while league average attendance was 14,819).
53. See MLS Teleconference, supra note 50 (stating reason for ceasing operation
of Tampa Bay was that it was run without Investor-Operator since its inception in
1996).
54. See id. (quoting MLS Commissioner Don Garber that comprehensive busi-
ness review of MLS revealed necessity for each team to have Investor-Operator).
55. See id. (quoting MLS Investor-Operator Kenneth Horowitz that investors
contributed over fifty million dollars in South Florida Soccer, entity responsible for
operating Miami Fusion).
56. Id. (quoting teleconference announcing contraction of Miami Fusion).
57. See id. (quoting Kenneth Horowitz's emphasis on lack of corporate sup-
port of Miami Fusion as well as other factors, such as timing of youth soccer league
schedules' contributing to attendance problems and general difficulties associated
with supporting professional sports teams in South Florida, including heat, rain,
and inclement weather).
58. See MLS Teleconference, supra note 50 (quoting MLS Commissioner
Garber's statement that problems existed with other MLS teams, such as lack of
[Vol. 10: p. 29
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IV. GoALs OF CONTRACTION
As commentators have often noted, owners have been "crying
wolf' about the possible demise of Major League Baseball since its
inception. 59 Albert Spalding, owner of the Chicago White Stock-
ings who later made his fortune in sporting goods in 1881, stated:
"Professional baseball is on the wane. Salaries must come down or
the interest of the public must be increased in some way. If one or
the other does not happen, bankruptcy stares every team in the
face." 60 Some years later, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig remarked,
"it makes no sense for Major League Baseball to be in markets that
generate insufficient local revenues to justify the investment in the
franchise." 61
A. Increased Revenues
So what are the goals of contraction for Major League Base-
ball? Primarily, contraction seeks to increase the revenues for each
team by eliminating teams that fail to generate sufficient local reve-
nue to provide a likelihood of accomplishing enduring competitive
and financial stability. 62
investors and venues, but because of other considerations and pending negotia-
tions with new investors, those teams were not chosen for contraction).
59. See Phil Rogers, Q&A with Baseball's Caretaker, Bud Selig, THE DALLAS MoR.N-
INc NEWS, Apr. 30, 1994, at 18B (quoting Bud Selig's chastising of commentators
who write books claiming MLB owners are crying wolf); Jayson Stark, Congress v.
Baseball: Antitrust Hearings, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/columns/stark jayson/
1290617.html (Dec. 7, 2001) (quoting noted sports antitrust attorney Jim Quinn's
belief that owners have been crying wolf since they first went to court in 1918
claiming they deserved antitrust exemption); Jayson Stark, Selig, Owners Have Some
'Splaining to Do, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/columns/stark-jayson/1286985.html
(Nov. 30, 2001) (explaining Bud Selig's Executive Vice President believed past his-
tory would not indicate that owners cry wolf when faced with contraction).
60. Jeffrey S. Moorad, Major League Baseball's Labor Turmoil: The Failure of the
Counter-Revolution, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 53 (1997) (noting labor relations
between players and team owners have always been highly contentious).
61. Associated Press, Owners Vote to Eliminate Two MLB Teams (Nov. 7, 2001),
available at http://msn.espn.go.com/mlb/news/2001/1106/1274159.html.
MLB Commissioner Bud Selig further explained that the two MLB teams to be
contracted historically failed to generate sufficient revenue. See id.
62. See Darren Rovell, Contraction Won't Necessarily Hurt Game's Image, at http:/
/www.espn.go.com/mlb/s/2001/1106/1274571.html (Nov. 6, 2001) (suggesting
contraction would result in increased profits among team owners who would re-
ceive larger revenues, including increased portion of six-year, $2.5 billion televi-
sion contract); Selig Presenting Testimony to Congress Today, at http://espn.go.com/
mlb/news/2001/1205/1290564.html (Dec. 6, 2001) (quoting Commissioner Bud
Selig's statement that "[i] t has also become clear that there are clubs that generate
so little in local revenue that they have no chance of achieving long-term competi-
tive and financial stability").
2003]
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MLB's revenue sharing plan is based heavily on the local oper-
ating revenue. 63 It is not based on attendance, wins or losses, or
profitability of the franchise. The system seeks to transfer money
from the big revenue clubs that generate a great deal of local in-
come to the clubs that do not.64 Each club, on a national basis,
receives an even share of all league-wide revenue, which in 2001 was
$24.4 million.65 Arizona and Tampa Bay, as part of their expansion
incentive, received approximately a three-quarters partial share of
the revenue of other teams, but will receive a full share beginning
in the 2003 season.66
MLB also has a formula for sharing local operating revenue.
Every team places twenty percent of their local operating revenue
into a pool. 67 Subsequently, seventy-five percent of that money is
redistributed evenly among the thirty MLB teams. 68 The remaining
twenty-five percent is divided based on a sliding scale among the
teams that generated less than the league-wide average in local op-
erating revenues. 69 In 2001, this figure amounted to $94.3
million.70
So what seems to be the problem in Philadelphia? The Phillies
had just over fifty-seven million dollars in local operating revenue. 71
Overall, MLB saw $167 million, which represented six percent of
the league-wide local operating revenue, transferred to low revenue
63. See Mychael Urban, Revenue Sharing: How It Works, Is It Working?, at http://
mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb-news_story.jsp?article id=mlb_
20011206_urban2_news&teamid=mlb (Dec. 6, 2001) (indicating revenue sharing
plan based heavily on local operating revenue).
64. See id. (explaining both national and local operating revenue sharing
plans in MLB).
65. See id. (explaining structure of sharing plan for national revenue among
MLB teams).
66. See id. (noting each club except Arizona and Tampa Bay receives equal
share of all national revenue).
67. See id.
68. See Urban, supra note 63 (explaining how local revenue pool is divided
evenly among teams).
69. See id.
70. See id. (noting that result of local-operating revenue sharing plan was
transfer of 5.9% of league-wide local operating revenue in 2001).
71. See Doug Pappas, The Numbers (Part Six): Profits and Revenue Sharing, at
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/news/20020204pappas.html (Feb. 4, 2002)
(providing amount of each MLB team's 2001 local operating revenue and amount
each team received through revenue sharing).
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clubs from high revenue teams in 2001.72 The Phillies alone were
awarded nearly $11.8 million of that total. 73
B. Reestablish Monopily Power
A second goal of contraction is to enhance and reestablish a
league's monopoly power. Professional sports leagues restrict entry
of new teams in order to increase both league-wide profits and
franchise values of particular teams.74 This restriction gives lever-
age to teams seeking new stadiums, allowing them to threaten local
governments with relocation plans. 75 MLB has been hesitant to al-
low teams to relocate. 76 There has not been a franchise relocation
in MLB since 1971 when the Texas Rangers were born from the
Washington Senators. 77
League expansion also has distinct reasons for occurring.
Leagues expand to deter entry and threat of rival leagues and to
increase their revenues by offering enhanced television contracts to
networks and by tapping into new fan bases. 78
The league must balance the restrictions on the number of
teams with its expansion goals. 79 The goal for professional sports
leagues is to retain a sufficient number of viable open markets to
maximize any of their teams' leverage by obtaining competitive bid-
ding among potential relocation cities, while retaining an insuffi-
cient number of cities to support a rival league.80
72. See Urban, supra note 63 (noting amount and percentage put into reve-
nue sharing).
73. See Pappas, supra note 71 (listing Phillies 2001 revenue sharing amount as
$11,752,000).
74. SeeJAMES P. QuIRK, HARD BALL: THE ABUSE OF POWER IN PRO TEAM SPORTS
136 (1999) (" [H]igh ratio of fans to teams in megalopolis cities is main reason for
lack of competitive balance in sports leagues.").
75. See id. (searching for source of problems in professional sports).
76. See Carrie Muskat, Selig Unveils Details of MLBs Financial Woes, at http://
mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb news story.jsp?article-id=mlb_
20011206_hearingspreview news&teamid=mlb (Dec. 6, 2001) (quoting Commis-
sioner Bud Selig's concern that eliminating MLB's antitrust exemption would al-
low for "middle-of-the-night relocations" that league has been able to prevent in
past).
77. See id. (discussing possible consequences of threatened revocation of
MLB's seventy-nine-year-old antitrust exemption).
78. See QuiR, supra note 74, at 136 (noting possible explanations for high
ratio of fans to teams and lack of competitive balance in sports leagues).
79. See id. (" [1]t appears that leagues have managed to expand sufficiently to
deter entry while still preserving enough vacant sites to make move threats believa-
ble, which is bad news, of course, for fans and taxpayers.)".
80. See id. at 135-36 ("The best weapon a monopoly league has to deter com-
petition from a rival league is to avoid leaving too many financially viable locations
open as slots for an entering rival league.").
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Previously, leagues had two or three cities that existed as poten-
tial relocation threats because of suitable empty stadiums. 81 MLB,
as well as the NBA, over-expanded in the 1990s. 8 2 These expan-
sions depleted monopolycpower and made it difficult for leagues to
find viable open markets. 8 3 For example, the Vancouver Grizzlies, a
young NBA team, moved to Memphis, Tennessee, the forty-second
largest market in the country.84 Memphis traditionally shunned all
of its professional sports franchises, and every professional sports
franchise that has ever played there folded.8 5
Other potential MLB cities, such as Washington, D.C. and
Northern Virginia, are fraught with problems not because of the
population, but because they are in Baltimore Orioles territory.8 6
Las Vegas, another city that is accompanied by substantial
problems, as well as New Orleans, Charlotte, Portland, Nashville,
Louisville, and Norfolk, would be hard-pressed to support a
franchise.8 7
81. See Joseph L. Bast, Sports Stadium Madness: Why It Started, How to Stop It
(Heartland Inst. Pol'y Study No. 85, 1998) (explaining so long as "even one city
with a suitable (empty) stadium is seeking a team, every other city is subject to
threats by their teams to relocate unless more subsidies are delivered"), available at
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artlD=9474655-FN228.
82. See SCULLY, supra note 34, at 23-24 ("Up until 1962, baseball had eight
teams in each league; in the 1993 season there were twenty-eight clubs."). The
NBA consisted of only eight teams in two divisions in the 1954 to 1955 season. See
id. at 24. As of 1995, there were twenty-seven teams in the league. See id.
83. See id. at 24. Further domestic expansion of the various leagues is difficult
because:
The remaining potential sites tend to be in small population centers or in
larger metropolitan areas that already have clubs. The expansion fees are
very high, mainly to cover the present value of reduced national broad-
cast revenues. The prospect for robust growth in revenues is dim, and
with free agency in baseball, basketball, and now football, an investor can
no longer get into a sport cheaply.
Id. at 23-24.
84. See Phil Stukenborg, Memphis Sports Moment on Way: NBA's Arrival Will Rank
Among City's Glories, at http://www.newgomemphis.com/newgo/grizzlies/story/
062901/xxmoment.htm Uune 29, 2001) (reporting NBA's approval of Grizzlies's
relocation and highlighting history of sports in Memphis).
85. See Associated Press, NBA Owners Approve Grizzlies' Move to Memphis (July 3,
2001) (noting Memphis has hosted minor league teams and courted NFL expan-
sion teams), available at http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/ce/multi/0,1329,4064167.
54,00.html.
86. See A Northern Virginia Team Will Not Undermine the Baltimore Orioles, Virginia
Baseball Stadium Authority, at http://www.baseballinva.org/caseorioles.htm (last
visited Oct. 20, 2002) (noting that although Baltimore Orioles have, by default,
developed fan base in Greater Washington region in twenty-eight years since Sena-
tors's departure, locating National League team in Northern Virginia will not in-
terfere with Baltimore's American League fan base).
87. See Thomas Heath, Baseball Ponders New Lineup: Struggling Teams Could
Move or Be Eliminated, WASH. POST, May 22, 2001, at Al (quoting Michael Megna,
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The significance of contraction is that it allows teams to make
greater use of the league monopoly capital and to increase political
capital for the existing teams.88 Additionally, for MLB, contraction
provides an opportunity for franchises to relocate in future years to
retain a significant financial windfall expansion fee. 89 This scenario
has already occurred with Cleveland and Houston in the NFL, and
perhaps will be seen again in Los Angeles. 90 The NHL presents
other examples with Minnesota and Atlanta; when these teams
moved out, expansion teams moved in for financial gain. 91
C. Improve Competitive Balance
A third goal of contraction is to improve competitive balance
in the caliber of play within the league by eliminating weaker clubs
and distributing quality players to existing clubs.92 Can MLB im-
prove its competitive balance, referred to as the relative quality of
play, or the caliber of play in the league, referred to as the absolute
quality of play?9 3 Not really. In terms of the relative quality of play,
the teams at the bottom of the league will still struggle with, as Bud
Selig states, "no hope and faith that their teams [can] reach the
postseason." 94 Also, the gap will remain between the "haves" and
Milwaukee-based financial appraiser of sports franchises, in his belief that there
are very few markets that would make attractive home for baseball team). In ana-
lyzing the success of a potential relocation to the Greater Washington region,
Megna considered such factors as the city's population, the popularity of other
professional sport leagues, and the proximity of the nearest MLB team. See id.
88. For a discussion of how professional sports league monopolies exert polit-
ical pressure, see supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
89. See Richard C. Levin et al., The Report of the Independent Members of the Com-
missioner's Blue Ribbon Panel On Baseball Economics (2000) (explaining that with con-
traction, purchase price paid for reacquisition of financially distressed clubs would
be less costly than value of all future shared industry revenues otherwise payable to
reacquired clubs), available at http://www.sportsline.com/u/baseball/mlbcom/
blueribbon.pdf.
90. See Eric Fisher, Baseball Contraction Lives, but So Do Its Unresolved Problems,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, at F8 (noting NFL emerged as stronger league after
allowing teams to move during 1990s), available at 2002 WL 2908434.
91. See id. (noting NHL emerged as stronger league after allowing teams to
move during 1990s). Selig's recent support for relocation of teams if their current
markets prove economically unviable has come "as welcome news to nearly every-
one." See id.
92. See SCULLY, supra note 34, at 23 (noting restrictions on number of teams in
league increases quality of play, which may be desirable to fans).
93. See id. at 23-24. Scully notes: "Quality of play in team sports has two
dimensions: absolute and relative. The absolute quality of play is its level, and that
depends on the quality of athletic talent fielded .... [RIelative playing quality is
measured by the dispersion in team standings." Id.
94. Alan H. (Bud) Selig, Address Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States House of Representatives (Dec. 6, 2001) (reporting findings released
in report by Blue Ribbon Panel in July 2000 showing only top spending teams had
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the "have-nots." 95  Thus, the economic system itself is still
paramount.
In terms of the absolute quality of play, removing the fifty worst
players from MLB will do little to improve the overall quality of the
league. 96 In effect, this solution only eliminates the two worst play-
ers from each team. 97 This is unlikely to have a significant effect
because the players removed are likely to be ineffective relief pitch-
ers and non-impact bench players. 98
D. Collective Bargaining Leverage
A fourth goal of contraction is to achieve collective bargaining
leverage for owners. This has an unknown effect on the league's
collective bargaining process. 99 In the short-term, however, it can
be assumed that introducing the possibility of contraction into the
bargaining process will have a substantial financial impact on the
league itself, especially if there is a work stoppage either by strike or
lockout. 100 For example, the threat of contraction or even its exe-
cution may affect players' salaries. 10 In the long-term, very little
effect is likely because supply and demand will offset the impact
any appreciable chance of reaching World Series), available at 2001 WL 26188117.
The disparity had become so severe, that for a five-year period between 1995 and
1999, and over 158 games, not a single postseason game was won by a team in the
bottom half of the industry payroll. See id.
95. See Darren Rovell, Owners Still Pushing Revenue Sharing, at http://
msn.espn.go.com/mlb/s/2001/1128/11286242.html (Nov. 28, 2001) (interpret-
ing "haves" and "have-nots" based on ability to generate local revenue). Rovell
notes:
By defining the haves as those that have a payroll in the top quartile of
the league, the competitive balance and financial picture is better clari-
fied. For example, 13 out of the 14 World Series participants in the last
seven years have been in the top eight in league payroll.
Id.
96. See Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Baseball Contraction, 2002 STAN. INST.
FOR ECON. POL'Y RES. 7 (noting elimination of two teams would eliminate fifty
MLB players).
97. See id. at 8 (suggesting most eliminated players would end up in minor
leagues).
98. See id. (noting that in year of contraction, weakest MLB players will be
demoted because they do not offer playing skills to compete with front-line
players).
99. See id. at 10 (discussing uncertain impact that contraction will have on
collective bargaining agreement). Noll notes: "There is simply no way to estimate
reliably whether the contraction announcement will harden or soften the position
of the players, and thereby increase or reduce the costs to the owners of success-
fully negotiating a new agreement." Id.
100. For a discussion of how the possibility of contraction affects the bargain-
ing process, see supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
101. See Noll, supra note 96, at 7-8 (noting contraction proposal tied to play-
ers' salaries).
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equally. 10 2 The weakest players who tend to make the least amount
of money are going to be sent to the minor leagues.10 3
V. COST OF CONTRACTION
Does contraction make financial sense? To determine this,
one must assess the various costs and benefits of the theory of
contraction.
A. Payments to Contracted Team
The first cost involves payments to the contracted team, which
amounts to what the buyout price will be to dissolve the team. 10 4
The Montreal Expos, arguably the worst team in MLB and perenni-
ally considered for contraction, was sold for $120 million in
2002.105 The highest estimate to date for the financially struggling
Minnesota Twins has been $250 million.10 6 The other teams that
were mentioned for contraction-the Kansas City Royals, Tampa
Bay Devil Rays, and Florida Marlins-would cost MLB almost $135
million each, based on the premium paid over their recent
purchase prices. 10 7
102. See id. at 8 (finding fan attendance depends on team performance, caus-
ing teams to drop poor players and pay more for good players).
103. See id. (explaining lack of effect contraction has on player salaries). The
weakest players, who also receive the lowest salaries, will be demoted to the minor
leagues, and the strongest players will continue to be in demand and receive the
highest salaries. See id. at 5, 8.
104. See id. at 2 (explaining significance of attractive buyout price in team's
decision to fold).
105. See Dave Sheinin, Montreal Lame Ducks, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2002, at D1
(noting Expos owner Jeffrey Loria sold team to MLB for $120 million). With that
money and a $38.5 million loan from MLB, Loria then bought the Marlins. See id.
106. See Randy Furst, Baseball Owners'Legal Fight Isn't Over, STAR TRIB. (Minne-
apolis), Feb. 13, 2002, at B3 (reporting Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission
attorney Corey Ayling contended Minnesota Twins received offers to buy team for
as much as $250 million). The more appropriate number that would be offered is
an estimated $135 to $190 million as the purchase price. See Noll, supra note 96, at
2.
107. See Noll, supra note 96, at 2 (discussing candidates for franchise buyout).
Although the price paid for these teams has not been disclosed, estimates are that
these "weak franchises" received between $135 and $250 million in their recent
purchases. See id. Kansas City was bought for ninety-six million dollars two years
ago. See Richard Sandomir, Newest Game Is Buying and Selling Teams, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 2000, § 8, at 11. Tampa Bay paid $130 million for an expansion fee to be
admitted into the league. See Joseph Duarte, Attempts to Bring Baseball to Disney's
World Appear Over, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2002, at 2G (indicating MLB admitted
team on March 9, 1995 for expansion fee of $130 million).
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B. Lease Payments
A second cost of contraction is lease payments. If MLB were to
contract a team, it must satisfy any remaining obligations under the
team's stadium lease.' 0 8 For Minnesota, Montreal, and Florida,
there would be no such cost because their leases all expire after the
2002 season. 10 9
Also in Tampa Bay, the lease cost is negligible. The Tampa Bay
franchise has a lease on Tropicana Field Stadium that extends
through 2027.110 In effect, the city pays the team a management
fee of $4.2 million a year, less $300,000 for fee sharing."' Thus,
contraction would make financial sense in terms of lease payments
because the cost is negligible.
Kansas City, the final team rumored for contraction, would in-
cur approximately a ten million dollar buyout cost for its lease.11 2
Kansas City's current lease extends through 2015 and the team pays
$450,000 a year to the city plus an excess percentage of gate re-
ceipts. 113 Therefore, the cost of lease payments must be consid-
ered, even if the cost is minimal.
C. Guaranteed Player Contracts
A third cost of contraction is the multi-year guaranteed con-
tracts of players on contracted teams. 114 Other teams may wish to
sign these players and assume their salaries, but when teams do not
opt to do this, MLB will be forced to bear the cost." 5 These un-
108. See Noll, supra note 96, at 5 (noting state court ruled that Minnesota
Twins must finish stadium contract and will most likely have to pay damages if it
breaks lease).
109. See No Guarantee Contraction Will Come Up for Vote, at http://espn.go.com/
mlb/news/2001/1105/1273878.html (Nov. 5, 2001) (noting Montreal, Minne-
sota, and Florida all have one-year stadium leases).
110. See Adam C. Smith & Bryan Gilmer, Naimoli Handing Over Rays Rein:
Changes for the Rays, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 28, 2001, at IA (noting Devil Rays's
lease obligation expires in 2027), available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sp-
times/.
11. See id. (explaining current bond debt on Devil Rays's stadium just six
million dollars shy of franchise value).
112. See Kyle Mead, Coaching Changes Follow Disappointing Season for Royals, at
http://www.spectrum.kcmetro.cc.mo.us/archives/2001-11-02/features/white/
htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (noting current Royals's lease keeps them in Kansas
City until at least 2015).
113. See id. (explaining Royals team owner committed to winning and does
not plan to relocate Royals to another city).
114. See Noll, supra note 96, at 5 (noting price of multi-year contracts must be
added to total cost of contraction).
115. See id. (explaining cost of contraction includes cost of players' multi-year
contracts not picked up by other teams).
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signed players will most likely be less-skilled players with short, less-
expensive contracts, but may include some higher-paid, long-term
contract players that teams do not want to sign because of age or
lack of production. 11 6 The high-end estimate cost of this portion of
the buyout is twenty-five to fifty million dollars.117
D. Purchase Price of Minor League Teams
The fourth expense of contraction is the purchase price of the
affiliated minor league clubs. In all likelihood, the twelve com-
bined minor league teams affiliated with any two contracted major
league clubs would be purchased and eliminated just like the major
league clubs. 118 The total purchase price of those clubs is between
fifty and seventy-five million dollars, plus the cost of their stadium
leases. 119 Altogether, after the four estimated groups of costs are
added together, MLB contraction would cost $500 million.' 20 This,
in turn, would cost each remaining team around $17.9 million.121
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the serious costs, contraction has attractive benefits.
As previously mentioned, there are more central and national reve-
nues for each club.122 In terms of broadcasting and licensing fees,
this amounts to twenty million dollars per team.' 23 Additionally,
116. See Average Baseball Salary, at http://www.canoe.ca/BaseballMoneyMat-
ters/salaries-avg.html (Dec. 12, 2002) (listing average and minimum MLB salaries
for 1967 to 2001 seasons).
117. See Noll, supra note 96, at 6. Noll estimates the cost of buying out con-
tracts and minor league teams to be $100 million together. See id. He individually
estimates the cost of eliminating minor league teams alone to be fifty to seventy-
five million dollars. See id. Subtracting the second amount from the first yields
twenty-five to fifty million dollars. See id.
118. See id. (noting there are twelve minor league teams affiliated with two
major league teams that could be bought out).
119. See id. (estimating that buying out twelve minor league teams would cost
at least additional fifty to seventy-five million dollars).
120. See id. The $500 million total is obtained by adding the $400 million
estimate to purchase two teams plus the $100 million estimate for buying out the
ousted players' contracts and the minor league teams affiliated with the eliminated
teams. See id.
121. See id. Dividing the $500 million among the twenty-eight remaining
teams equals $17.9 million per team. See id.
122. See Noll, supra note 96, at 6 (noting each remaining team would receive
more revenue from MLB broadcasting and licensing rights).
123. See id. (stating out of twenty million dollars total, fourteen million comes
from Fox Television rights).
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there would be a decrease in the amount of local revenues that are
shared between the weaker clubs. 124
The Expos received a little over $28.5 million from additional
revenue sharing during the 2001 season.125 The Twins received
$19.1 million, while the Florida Marlins obtained $18.6 million.1 26
Kansas City and Tampa Bay acquired $16 million and $12.4 million
respectively.127
In terms of the benefits of contraction, the question is, how
much money are the surviving teams going to save by eliminating
the various clubs? Eliminating the Expos would collectively save
MLB teams approximately $52.9 million per year. 128 Eliminating
the Twins would save the clubs $43.5 million a year and elimination
of the Marlins would save $43 million. 129 Dissolving the Royals
would save $40.4 million while contracting the Devil Rays would
give back $30.6 million to MLB. 130 Furthermore, eliminating both
the Expos and the Twins would save every one of the other MLB
clubs approximately $3.4 million per year. 31
After crunching the numbers to get the expected return, it is
easy to determine which teams are worth contracting. The Expos
are certainly worth folding. 13 2 Although contracting the Twins
would not provide as great a benefit as would eliminating the Ex-
124. See id. at 6-7 (illustrating elimination of weaker MLB teams would termi-
nate their windfalls).
125. See Special Report: Economics of Baseball, Comparison by Club, at
www.mlb.com/mlb/hearings/downloads/comparison-by-club.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Special Report] (noting potential generating loss of
$10,002,000 after revenue sharing).
126. See id. (stating both Twins and Marlins incurred past revenue sharing
operating losses of $536,000 and $9,180,000 respectively).
127. See id. (explaining Royals incurred past operating loss after revenue shar-
ing of $137,000 while Devil Rays incurred $10.5 million).
128. See id. This figure is reached by adding the $28.5 million the Expos
received to the $24.4 million in central revenues. See id.
129. See id. The figure for the Twins is reached by adding the $19.1 million
the Twins received to the $24.4 million in central revenues. See id. For the Mar-
lins, this figure is reached by adding the $18.6 million the Marlins received to the
$24.4 million in central revenues. See id.
130. See Special Report, supra note 125. The Royals figure is reached by adding
the $16 million with $24.4 million in central revenues. See id. The Devil Rays fig-
ure is reached by adding the $12.4 million with $18.2 million in central revenues.
See id.
131. See id. This figure is obtained by adding the combined savings to the
other clubs from contracting the Expos ($52.9 million) and Twins ($43.5 million)
and then dividing this total ($96.4 million) among the remaining twenty-eight
MLB teams.
132. See Noll, supra note 96, at 7 (stating revenues would increase by approxi-
mately forty-five million dollars if Montreal were eliminated).
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pos, the Twins are also worth folding. 1 3 Thus, MLB would be fi-
nancially justified in contracting the Expos and Twins.1 34
This, however, does not adequately address all the problems
facing MLB. There are growing revenue disparities, insufficient
levels of revenue sharing, and competitive imbalances that are all
intertwined. 135 As told by former Commissioner Bowie Kuhn when
discussing contraction, "[i]t is not the only solution, but not any
one solution is going to fix the problems the industry is facing." 136
What else can MLB do? Primarily, MLB must start with follow-
ing some of the recommendations of baseball economists: sharing
more local revenues; putting a luxury tax on player payrolls that
exceed certain thresholds; having an unequal distribution of any
new MLB Central Fund revenues; permitting special fund revenues;
reforming the Rule 4 Draft; instituting a competitive balance draft;
and allowing MLB clubs to exercise their monopoly power by relo-
cating. Many of these issues, however, must be collectively bar-
gained with the MLB Players Association, and thus the resolution is
not as clear-cut as it appears. Regardless, it represents a good start-
ing point for the reformation of Major League Baseball.
133. See id. at 6 (estimating portion of central revenues received by teams
from MLB is $24.4 million). Folding the Twins would save MLB $43.4 million
($24.4 million from the central revenues added to $19 million received from reve-
nue sharing). See Special Report, supra note 125 (indicating Minnesota receives $19
million from revenue sharing).
134. See Noll, supra note 96, at 7 (noting MLB would save forty-five million
dollars from folding Expos and thirty-nine million dollars from folding Twins).
135. See Special Report, supra note 125 (revealing operating revenues, operating
expenses, amount received from revenue sharing, and operating income after rev-
enue sharing different among MLB franchises).
136. Jim Street, Kuhn: Contraction, Additional Steps Make Sense, at http://www.
mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb-news-story.jsp?article-id=mlb_20011129
_bowiekuhnnews&team-id=mlb (Nov. 29, 2001). Ex-Commissioner Kuhn also
stated that "contracting two teams is a good idea at this time, but that it is only part
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